Introduction
Controversy over the structure of securities markets is a hardy perennial.
Technology changes, faces change, but the market structure debate has remained surprisingly static since the debates over the Securities and Exchange Act in [1933] [1934] . Through the early years of the SEC, the Special Study on Securities Markets in 1963, the formation of the National Market System in the 1970s, and the recent controversy over the structure of future electronic securities markets, two themes have de¯ned the debate: fragmentation and competition. On the one hand, it has been argued vociferously that fragmentation of trading in securities is ine±cient, especially when o®-exchange trading venues \cream skim" uninformed order°ow; critics of fragmentation typically advocate measures to centralize securities trading. On the other hand, it has been argued equally vociferously that fragmentation creates competition absent which exchanges would exercise market power to the bene¯t of their members and to the detriment of the trading public; advocates of this position view regulatory measures designed to centralize trade (such as the creation of a mandatory central limit order book or \CLOB") as unwarranted checks on competition.
This article attempts to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable views by constructing a model of the \macrostructure" of a securities market{ the number of trading venues, their size, their market shares, and the poli- These results derive from the nature of liquidity. Liquidity creates network e®ects that induce centralization of trading. Traders operating on an exchange can exploit this centripetal tendency and increase their profits by limiting access to the exchange. Cream skimming o®-exchange trading venues arise in response to the restrictive policies of the exchange, and provide competition and additional risk bearing capacity that o®-sets in part the deadweight costs associated with exchange restrictions. When access to the exchange is not restricted, cream skimming third markets sometimes can survive by o®ering better terms of trade to some uninformed market participants even though it would be¯rst best to centralize all trading. Under these conditions, forced centralization improves welfare as long as access to the exchange is unrestricted.
The issues of open access and cream skimming are not unique to securities trading. Indeed, they are the primary sources of controversy in virtually all network industries, including telecommunications and electricity transmission. The similarities between securities markets and telecom or transmission markets should not be surprising because liquidity e®ectively makes security trading a network industry. Thus, regulation of security market structure is a piece with the regulation of other network industries and must confront the same basic issues. Most important, as in telecoms or electricity transmission, mandated open access to securities markets is a desirable public policy in the abstract. In reality, however, mandated open access raises serious practical issues that do not admit easy solution. In particular, treating the market as a public good can lead to underproduction and overconsumption of key attributes of the trading system. Thus, analysis of security market structure needs to come to better grips than it has heretofore with property rights issues that have absorbed students of \public utility" regulation for decades.
This research represents a¯rst step in that process.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the formal framework of the analysis. Section 3 analyzes security market structure under varying assumptions about exchange access, centralization, and free riding. Section 4 discusses some of the di±culties of implementing an open access trading mechanism. Section 5 summarizes the article. Noise trader demand and the value of the asset are orthogonal.
Micro Foundations

1
Noise traders, in turn, come in two varieties. The¯rst variety{the \U1" type{are veri¯ably uninformed; by implementing a screening technology, liquidity suppliers (described more fully below) can determine whether a trader is of the U1 type and therefore uninformed. In contrast, the other variety{ the \U2" type{are not veri¯ably uninformed; the screening technology cannot distinguish the U2s from the informed. 2 Fraction q ¤ < :5 of the noise traders are U1s, and fraction 1 ¡ q ¤ > :5 are U2s.
3
As an example of a screening technology, small noise traders may be able to represent credibly that they are uninformed, whereas large noise traders may not. Reputation and trading constraints (such as the \no bagging" constraint analyzed in Seppi, 1990) are other means by which some (but not all) large uninformed traders can identify themselves as such. Other mechanisms, such as using periodic auctions rather than continuous trading, may also serve to segment some uninformed traders.
This assumption of an imperfect screening mechanism is crucial to understanding market macrostructure. It is well known that such mechanisms exist in practice. Moreover, this assumption has empirical content; as will be seen, it generates predictions that are consistent with salient features of security market macrostructure, whereas alternative assumptions lead to counter-factual predictions. For instance, if no screening is possible, the model implies that only one trading venue survives in equilibrium; such a model could not explain the existence of Mado® or crossing networks. Alternatively, if market makers can identify all uninformed traders, they would restrict their dealings to the uninformed; securities prices and trading would be uninformative in this case. This is inconsistent with overwhelming evidence. In contrast, the analysis will demonstrate that the partial screening assumption permits the existence of multiple trading venues (such as third market dealers and crossing networks). Moreover, with partial screening, the model implies that o®-exchange prices are less informative than exchange prices (because o®-exchange venues limit informed trading whereas exchanges do not). This is consistent with the empirical evidence. Easley et al. (1996) show that orders executed on one third market (Cincinnati) are substantially less informative than orders submitted to the NYSE. Hasbrouck (1997) In addition to the noise traders and the informed traders, there is a set of potential liquidity suppliers (also referred to as market makers) L = f1; 2; : : : ; N g. Each liquidity supplier j · N is risk averse, with a constant absolute risk aversion coe±cient ® j . Equivalently, the risk tolerance of intermediary j is t j = 1=® j . Moreover, wlog t j > t k for j < k. That is, intermediaries are ordered by decreasing risk tolerance. The total supply of risk bearing capacity (i.e., aggregate risk tolerance) is
The assumption of risk averse market makers is realistic and important. Limits on the capital of market makers constrain their ability to bear inventory risk and induce them to act as if they are risk averse. It is well documented that market makers in securities are compensated for bearing risk, which would not occur if they were risk neutral. Moreover, the existence of limits to market makers' risk bearing capacity implies that the size of exchange size has e±ciency implications; risk is borne ine±ciently if exchanges restrict membership to a suboptimally small number.
The next section analyzes market structure under varying assumptions about (1) the ability of liquidity suppliers to form coalitions with restricted membership and (2) the ability of some liquidity suppliers to restrict their dealings to those who can prove they are uninformed. Variations in these assumptions generates four distinct regimes.
In the¯rst regime, liquidity suppliers can form coalitions that restrict membership. That is, some market makers may be excluded from a coalition.
I refer to a group of market makers as an exchange. In the¯rst regime, all coalitions of intermediaries are obligated to trade in a non-discriminatory fashion. That is, they must accept market orders from all traders and cannot refuse to deal with those that they believe to be informed; equivalently they cannot use the screening technology to restrict their dealings to those they know to be noise traders.
In the second regime, liquidity suppliers can form coalitions that restrict membership. Unlike the¯rst regime, however, in the second regime intermediaries can refuse to deal with customers. In particular, in the second regime, Due to this di®erence in the timing of trading, cream skimming markets can observe{and free ride on{prices determined on exchange. 7 In the auctions, participating liquidity suppliers condition their trades on observed net order°o w (noise trader net order°ow plus the informed orders).
In regimes three and four, where exchanges cannot restrict entry, liq-uidity suppliers choose the exchange they trade on non-cooperatively and simultaneously.
The next section analyzes equilibrium market structure in these four regimes. The analysis derives the number of exchanges and cream skimming coalitions in each regime. It also derives total surplus. Given the assumption of inelastic noise trader demand, total surplus is determined by the total cost of operating the market, where total cost equals noise trader execution costs minus informed trader pro¯t minus the risk adjusted pro¯t of market makers.
A¯rst best market macrostructure minimizes total cost.
3 Macrostructure Under the Four Regimes
Regime One
Consider the trading process when two coalitions{exchanges{form; the analysis can be extended readily to incorporate an arbitrary number of exchanges.
The total risk tolerance (the sum of the risk tolerances) of the members of exchange 1 is T 1 , and the total risk tolerance of exchange 2 is T 2 < T 1 . Assume initially that fraction q 1 of the noise traders have chosen to trade on exchange 1, and q 2 = 1 ¡ q 1 . Due to the independence of noise trader demands, the variance of noise trader order°ow on exchange 1 is S 1 = q 1 S, and the variance of noise trader order°ow on exchange 2 is S 2 = q 2 S.
Analysis of equilibrium proceeds in the standard way. Upon learning v the informed traders conjecture that the price on exchange i, i = 1; 2 is a linear function of order°ow:
where w ik is the order that the informed trader k submits to exchange i, z i is net noise trader demand on exchange i, and¸i is a constant.¸i measures the sensitivity of the security's price to variations in order°ow. Its reciprocal is referred to as market \depth;" greater depth (smaller¸i) desirable because it implies lower transactions costs for noise traders.
Given this conjecture of a linear price function, the informed trader l chooses w il , i = 1; 2 to maximize:
where the expectation is taken over z i . Since v and z i are orthogonal, the symmetric solution of the informed traders' maximization problems implies:
That is,¯i = 1=[(K + 1)¸i].¯i measures the intensity of informed trading.
Conditional on order°ow liquidity supplier j on exchange i chooses his trade y j to maximize his certainty-equivalent pro¯t. Given the strategies of the informed and the market makers, the analysis in the appendix shows that in equilibrium:¸i
where3 2 is the variance of the asset value conditional on order°ow (which is also derived in the appendix). Since order°ow communicates information about v (because the informed buy (sell) more when v is high (low)),
Expression (4) shows that the sensitivity of price to order°ow in exchange i consists of two parts. The¯rst part is the cost that intermediaries incur to absorb the risk of order°ow imbalances. The second term is the adverse selection cost incurred when trading with the informed.
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Taking the derivative of expression (4) after substituting¯i = 1=(K +1)¸i
This means that the sensitivity of price on exchange i to order°ow is smaller, the larger the fraction of noise traders who select to trade on exchange i.
Equivalently, market depth on exchange i is greater, the larger the fraction of noise traders who trade there. It is also straightforward to show that
That is, price on exchange i is less sensitive to order°ow, the larger the total risk tolerance of its members. Finally, d3
conditional variance is increasing in the variance of noise trader order°ow.
These results determine where noise traders choose to transact. Each noise trader takes the expected cost of execution on each exchange as a given and chooses to trade where the per-noise trader cost of execution is smallest.
The per-noise trader expected execution cost on exchange i is given by:
Since¸i is decreasing in q i , exchanges are subject to increasing returns to scale; per uninformed trader expected execution costs are smaller, the larger the number of noise traders that choose to trade on that exchange. Liquidity e®ects create economies of scale. In the presence of informed traders, a noise trader prefers to trade where the largest number of other noise traders congregate in order to minimize losses from adverse selection.
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This analysis implies that there are three possible equilibria in this market when noise traders choose where to trade simultaneously. Figure 1 illustrates these equilibria. The horizontal axis in the¯gure is q 1 , the fraction of noise traders that choose to trade on exchange 1. The downward sloping curve is 1 S, the average noise trader execution cost on exchange 1; the downward slope indicates the economies of scale. The upward sloping curve is¸2S, the average noise trader execution cost on exchange 2. The upward slope also indicates economies to scale, as an increase in q 1 implies a decrease in q 2 , and thus a rise in execution costs on that exchange. I utilize the standard criterion that the noise traders coordinate their choice to minimize their costs.
10 If T 1 > T 2 , the fact that execution costs are decreasing in an exchange's total risk tolerance implies that x 1 (1; T 1 ) < x 2 (1; T 2 ). Therefore, in this case, the lowest cost equilibrium involves all noise traders choosing to trade on the exchange with the greatest risk bearing capacity{exchange 1.
This fact in°uences the equilibrium allocation of intermediaries among exchanges. This allocation must satisfy several equilibrium conditions. 11 First, in equilibrium no additional exchanges must be able to enter pro¯tably. That is, no coalition of intermediaries outside the equilibrium exchange(s) can earn a pro¯t for each of its members by forming an exchange. Second, the members of an equilibrium exchange cannot increase their pro¯ts by altering the size of their exchange's membership. Third, if a total ofL intermediaries belong to exchanges, then the equilibrium allocation requires intemediaries f1; : : : ;Lg to belong to exchanges. This condition re°ects the fact that exchange memberships are transferrable. If intermediary j is a member of an exchange, and intermediary i < j is not, there is a price at which i could buy the membership from j that makes both parties better o®.
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The only coalition of intermediaries that satis¯es these conditions is L ¤ = f1; 2; : : : ; L ¤ g, where
A , and
aries in L ¤ account for just over half of the total risk tolerance; if intermediary L ¤ were excluded from the coalition, the exchange would o®er less than one-half of total risk tolerance. This exchange can attract all noise traders because execution costs are higher on every other possible coalition (since every other exchange has lower total risk tolerance). Moreover, an exchange consisting of some strict subset of the intermediaries in L ¤ would attract no business because another exchange with greater total risk tolerance would enter, capture all of the order°ow, and earn a pro¯t; such a subset cannot be an equilibrium exchange.
Furthermore, the members of L ¤ are harmed by the addition of more members. The appendix shows that exchange member j's pro¯t is:
Since (6) implies that dE(¦ j )=dT 1 < 0, the pro¯tability of an exchange member j 2 L ¤ declines if additional members are added; increasing membership beyond L ¤ increases the competition faced by those in L ¤ , and thereby reduces their pro¯ts.
13
Together, these results imply that in equilibrium, the exchange consists of the intermediaries j 2 L ¤ . Consequently, total equilibrium risk tolerance
Given the formation of such a coalition, no other exchange can enter pro¯tably. Moreover, both increases and decreases in the membership of this coalition reduce the pro¯ts of its members.
Thus, in the absence of cream skimming, the equilibrium exchange is a monopoly that limits the number of intermediaries it admits to increase the pro¯ts of its members. Limits on the number of members are a near universal feature of¯nancial exchanges. This article derives these limits endogenously from fundamental microstructural considerations.
14 Note that optimal risk bearing requires the exchange to admit all intermediaries f1; 2; : : : ; N g. The appendix shows that total cost with the monopoly exchange is :5¾ 2 S=T 1 . Total costs equal execution costs minus certainty-equivalent member pro¯ts minus informed trading pro¯ts. The cost of operating the market is minimized, and welfare is maximized, when 
Regime Two
The preceeding analysis shows that only one exchange that trades in a non- In what follows, I assume that all intermediaries who are excluded from the exchange trade in the third market. That is, I assume that entry to the third market is open and unrestricted. 15 I also assume that the exchange continues to restrict membership to L ¤ .
16
Recall that cream skimming dealers can free ride on the exchange's price discovery. That is, third market dealers' estimate of the variance of the price of the traded asset is3 2 , not ¾ 2 . Since there is no informed trading in the third market, an analysis like that used to derive (4) implies that the¸of the third market is¸3 =3 2 =T 3 , where T 3 is total risk tolerance on the third market. Therefore, in the¯rst regime, the expected execution cost of each trader who chooses to trade in the third market is:
Assuming that exchange membership is given by the coalition L ¤ , where as before this coalition o®ers just more than half of the total risk tolerance, and there is free entry onto the third market, total risk tolerance thereon is
A comparison of (7) to (4)- (5) shows immediately that average execution costs on the exchange assuming all noise traders trade there is higher than average execution cost on the third market. That is, The foregoing implies that the third market attracts all the demonstrably uninformed, whereas all others trade on exchange. This analysis implies that prices on the third market should be less informative than trading on the exchange. As noted earlier, there is substantial empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. Result 1 and the fact that¸1 is increasing in q ¤ together imply that the creation of a third market reduces execution costs for the noise traders who can switch to the third market, and raises the execution costs of those who cannot. The e®ect of the entry of a third market on total noise trader execution costs depends on which e®ect dominates.
Total noise trader execution costs on exchange and third market are:
where¸1 is given by (4) with S 1 = (1 ¡ q ¤ )S, and¸3 is given above; the notation is expanded to recognize the dependence of the¸'s on q ¤ and T 1 and T 3 . After some substitutions, this expression becomes:
where3 2 and¯1 are now written as functions to recognize explicitly their
Therefore,
). This proves:
Result 2 Introduction of a free-riding open entry third market unambiguously reduces total noise trader execution costs.
Thus, although the third market harms some noise traders, in aggregate noise traders are better o® when a free riding third market is introduced.
Indeed, the third market increases total surplus if the third market free rides. The appendix shows that with free riding total cost equals: This improvement is attributable to the fact that the third market improves the e±ciency of risk bearing. The third market dealers supply additional risk bearing capacity to the market. Although this reduces the pro¯ts of the exchange members, their loss is more than o®set by the gains realized by noise traders and third market dealers.
Although equilibrium surplus in the second regime is larger than in thē rst, the second regime equilibrium is not¯rst best. Note that
Since3 2 < ¾ 2 , this expression holds for q ¤ < :5. Since :5¾ 2 S=T A is the cost of operating the market when all liquidity suppliers trade on the exchange, total costs are not minimized in the second regime even though they are lower than in the¯rst regime.
These results imply that an open entry third market that free rides on exchange prices improves market performance. This may seem counterintuitive as it implies that an externality{the free acquisition of costly trade information by the third market{improves welfare. 19 This result obtains because we are in the world of the second best. The \tippiness" of the exchange market leads to a natural monopoly that restricts the supply of risk bearing to enhance its members' pro¯ts. This is ine±cient. The externality reduces the costs of enhancing the supply of risk bearing and mitigates the ine±ciency.
Regime Three
When access to any trading venue must be open, liquidity suppliers must choose which one to trade on. The analysis of section 3.1 implies that only a single non-cream skimming venue can exist. Therefore, liquidity suppliers must choose between trading on the exchange (which does not cream skim) and the third market (which does).
There may be several equilibria in this regime. Note that as exchange risk tolerance T 1 increases, execution costs fall on the exchange and rise on the cream skimming market (because a rise in T 1 implies a decline in T 3 ).
Thus, there is some critical value of T 1 ,T 1 , such that if T 1 >T 1 (and hence T 3 < T A ¡T 1 ) the third market cannot survive.
The fact that the third market must achieve some critical mass to survive implies that under most conditions one equilibrium is for all liquidity suppliers to join the exchange. Speci¯cally, this is an equilibrium if T A ¡ t 1 >T 1 .
To see why, assume initially that all market makers join the exchange. If any single market maker leaves the exchange, third market risk tolerance
Therefore, the sole third market dealer gets no business, and earns a pro¯t of zero. This is smaller than his pro¯t on the exchange.
Thus, there is no incentive to defect and T 1 = T A is an equilibrium.
Equilibria that exhibit fragmentation may exist as well. This is most easily depicted graphically, as in Figure 2 . The¯gure depicts two curves.
The downward sloping curve depicts ¦ 1 j (:), the pro¯t of market maker j if he joins the exchange when its total risk tolerance is T 0 1 . This curve is downward sloping because the pro¯tability of belonging to the exchange declines as the quantity of risk bearing capacity its members can supply increases. The upward sloping curve is ¦ 
Regime Four
Equilibrium in Regime Four is quite simple. Since cream skimming is not permitted, the analysis in section 3.1 implies that all transactions occur on an exchange that conducts a non-discriminatory auction. Moreover, since
the exchange is open to all, all liquidity suppliers join it. Thus, the¯rst best is achieved in this regime. The nature of liquidity drives these results. Liquidity exerts a centripetal force that attracts trading to a central market. Liquidity suppliers can exploit this force to raise pro¯ts by restricting entry if allowed to do so. Fragmentation is one market response to such strategic behavior, but a more e±cient result obtains if exchanges cannot limit the number of members.
Flies in the Ointment
The results of the foregoing section imply that elimination of o®-exchange trading can improve welfare, just as the critics of cream skimming argue. One key di±culty is that if the trading network is privately owned by a¯rm or group of¯rms that supply liquidity on it, the owner(s) may be able to restrict access to the network through manipulation of interfaces or other technical means. The owner may rationalize these policies on technical grounds, which may include network security or stability. In a securities trading context, the private for-pro¯t operator of the centralized market may use solvency and performance concerns to constrain access by imposing unduly burdensome¯nancial requirements on would-be participants; restriction of access in this way would allow the operator to increase pro¯ts if it also provides liquidity on the system.
Disintegration{rules that preclude the owner-operator of the trading network from trading itself{would diminish the incentive for the owner-operator to limit access in this fashion. Notably, disintegration has been a feature of deregulation in several network industries in the US. Disintegration does not eliminate another di±culty, however; the owner-operator may exploit market power derived from the nature of liquidity by charging supracompetitive prices to liquidity suppliers for access. Moreover, disintegration can increase transactions costs (Joskow, 2000) .
The foregoing problems{the di±culty of enforcing open access and the potential for supracompetitive pricing{have been constant themes in discussions of the regulation of network industries. Attempts to resolve these di±culties raise their own problems. In particular, elaborate rules designed to ensure that network operators do not restrict access increase the potential for ine±cient gaming behavior. Moreover, rules intended to make networks more accessible may turn the network into a quasi-public good. This tends to reduce the ability of the network owner-operator to internalize bene¯ts from improving the quality of the network or reducing operating costs. Finally, mitigating market power through rate regulation or other means leads to well-known incentive and information problems.
Although the formal analysis does not consider the costs of building, operating, or pricing access to a central market, they are likely to be important practical concerns in securities markets. This is particularly true given the ongoing technological revolution in securities trading. A state-of-the-art securities trading system is capital intensive. Moreover, due to technological change, it is likely that there is considerable scope for innovation and future system enhancement. Under these circumstances, regulations intended to ensure open access may reduce the incentive of the system owner-operator to improve and innovate. Furthermore, the necessity of incurring large¯xed costs to create a trading system requires implementation of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing mechanisms to achieve e±ciency. Regulators have faced di±culties in implementing such mechanisms in other network industries. What is the right organizational structure for the owner of the system? How must the owner(s)' property rights (notably the right to exclude) be attenuated to achieve open access? How will these attenuations of rights in°uence incentives to improve system performance and to develop system enhancements? These questions are not exhaustive. Moreover, the answers may be technology dependent. 
Summary and Conclusions
The macrostructure and e±ciency of a securities market depend on the in- Open access is di±cult to achieve in practice, as the operators of networks may have the incentive and ability to o®er access to a suboptimally small number of participants either explicitly or through supracompetitive pricing.
Moreover, rules and regulations designed to combat such strategic behavior may make crucial parts of the central trading facility public goods. If these are not priced properly, there will be overconsumption and underproduction of key attributes of the trading system.
Put di®erently, securities markets are made, not born. 24 Making them e±cient requires the speci¯cation of the appropriate property rights. The current property rights regime gives securities exchanges the right to exclude intermediaries from membership and allows considerable free riding on exchange-generated price information; although the second attribute of this regime has received considerable attention, the¯rst has not. The analysis of this article implies that the exclusionary practices of exchanges leads to inefcient risk bearing, but that free riding and cream skimming mitigate these ine±ciencies. This article also implies that at a theoretical level, this property rights structure is exactly backwards; an e±cient structure would deny exchanges the right to exclude but would prevent o®-exchange dealers from free riding on exchange price information and skimming uninformed order°o w. In essence, restrictions on property rights similar to those imposed on common carriers under common law can improve securities market e±ciency. 
A Appendix
Derivation of¸i. Conditional on order°ow, liquidity supplier j chooses his trade y j to maximize his certainty-equivalent pro¯t. Formally:
where3 2 is the variance of v conditional on total order°ow K¯iv + z i , and where P is given by (1) . The¯rst term inside the brackets is the market maker's expected pro¯t from a trade of y j units. The second term adjusts for the risk of holding y j units;3 2 y 2 j is the variance of j's wealth, and ¡:5=t j is the cost per unit of variance.
Note that due to the normality of v and z i , E[vjK¯iv + z i ] is given by the regression of v on K¯iv + z i . Thus,
Moreover, by (1), E[P jK¯iv + z i ] =¸i(K¯iv + z i ), and
Call L i the set of intermediaries on exchange i. Market clearing implies:
Thus,
where T i = P j2L i t j . This, in turn, implies:
Proof that3 2 is increasing in S i . To see that conditional price variance is increasing in S, recall that3
Thus, the sign of d3 2 =dS is given by the sign of:
The quadratic that de¯nes¯is:
Therefore:
Making further substitutions from the quadratic implies:
This implies:
Since
The inequality holds because¯> 0.
Derivation of Exchange Member Pro¯t. First note that by (13) and (15), the position of trader j 2 L ¤ is equal to
where subscripts are suppressed because there is only a single exchange.
The expected certainty-equivalent pro¯t of any member j 2 L ¤ is given by:
where this expectation is taken over the unconditional joint distribution of v and z. Therefore,
After some additional substitution, this reduces to
Derivation of Total Cost. The total cost of operating the market equals noise trader's execution costs minus informed trader pro¯ts minus certaintyequivalent market maker pro¯ts. Given v and z, exchange execution costs are z¸1(¯v +z), informed traders' pro¯ts are ¡K¯v¸1(K¯v +z)+Kv 2 =(K +1)¸1
and certainty-equivalent market maker pro¯ts are:
, this simpli¯es to:
Substituting for3 2 and simplifying implies that the total cost of trading on the exchange is:
Taking expectations over v and z implies that expected total cost equals:
Similar analysis implies that with free riding, the expected total cost of operating the third market is:
Endnotes 1 This is a simpli¯ed version of the Chowdhry-Nanda (1991) framework.
In simplify the approach by considering only small discretionary noise traders.
Unlike Chowdhry-Nanda, I assume that market makers are risk averse.
2 Admati-P°eiderer (1991) also assume the existence of an exogenous number of noise traders that can credibly disclose that they are uninformed. \no coordination failure" assumption is standard in network models. Moreover, the analysis can be made dynamic. Given the assumptions made here, if noise traders choose where to trade sequentially, Farrell and Saloner (1985) Propositions 1 and 3 imply that the unique perfect equilibrium is for noise traders to choose the exchange that minimizes total execution cost.
11 See Pirrong (1999) for a more formal statement of these conditions.
12 Expression (6) below shows that a member's pro¯t is increasing in t j , which implies the stated result. 13 Competition between members does not drive their pro¯ts to zero because (a) each member's supply curve of risk bearing services is upward sloping due to risk aversion, and (b) the number of market makers is¯nite.
Thus, the exchange supply curve of risk bearing services is upward sloping, and members earn a scarcity rent in equilibrium. Restrictions on entry increase the scarcity rent.
14 Exchange members may enhance their pro¯ts by other means, such as mandating a supracompetitive \tick" size or collusion. Network e®ects give them the market power required for these arrangements to survive. 15 This assumption is motivated by the observation that most historical third markets, including the OTC market in listed stocks, bucket shops, and so on, have not restricted entry. See Pirrong (2001) for an analysis of restricted-entry third markets. That analysis shows that restrictions on the size of the third market reduce surplus. This reinforces the basic claim of this article that entry restrictions in¯nancial markets are a source of ine±ciency. 16 The exchange will limit membership to L ¤ for some values of q ¤ , but if q ¤ is big enough it may respond to the competitive threat of the third market by expanding membership. See Pirrong (2001) for a detailed analysis of this case. That analysis shows that the exchange will always o®er risk tolerance that is less than T A , so the equilibrium is not¯rst best even if the exchange expands. However, total cost is lower if the exchange expands than if it does not. Therefore, the potential for free riding and cream skimming improves welfare relative to a regime where exchanges can limit entry and need fear no competition from cream skimming markets. 17 The execution price on the third market has mean E(vjP 1 ), where P 1 is the exchange price. The third market price varies randomly around this mean with random variations in noise trader order°ow because third market dealers require compensation for bearing the risk taken on when they absorb noise trader order imbalances. 18 If information is costly to obtain, and therefore the number of informed traders is endogenous, there is another welfare gain from the third market.
The third market reduces the returns from information, and consequently leads to reduced expenditures on information. This is bene¯cial because informed trading is a form of rent seeking in this model (and other microstructure models as well). The bene¯ts from the third market are reduced to the extent that screening is costly. 19 Pirrong (2001) also shows that prices are more informative when a third market exists. 20 Of course an exchange may perform other functions, such as clearing and market oversight. 21 The formal analysis assumes that all noise traders are homogeneous, and care only about execution costs. In fact, liquidity demanders may be het- It should be noted that some existing trading mechanisms that o®er di®erent attributes (e.g., crossing networks that cater to patient traders who do not demand immediacy) may serve as mechanisms for screening out the informed. 23 Pirrong (2000) shows that there is likely to be a linkage between trading technology and the e±cient form of organization and governance of exchanges. 
